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American “Intervention” in the Russian Civil War: 1918-1920

Why did President Woodrow Wilson decide to send American troops into Siberia and Northern Russia on August 16, 1918?

-History-

Word Count: 4090

Scott Reed

Candidate #: D0993112

International Academy

Marc De Zwaan

May 2007

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………... 2

Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………….. 3

Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………… 4

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………… 5

·        Background to the Conflict ………………………………………………….. 7

·        Wilson as an Anti-Bolshevist ………………………………………………... 9

·        Forced into Intervention ……………………………………………………. 13

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………... 18

End Notes ………………………………………………………………………………. 21

Works Cited ……………………………………………………………………………. 24

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Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to investigate American President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to send troops to North Russia and Siberia during the Russian Civil War, and to what extent, if at all, the troops were intended as a means to destroy the Bolshevik Regime to which Wilson was ideologically opposed.  The central question throughout the essay is whether Wilson’s ideological opposition to Lenin’s regime was strong enough to overcome his resistance to directly interfering with the Russian political situation. 

            The time period that the essay will focus on is between Germany’s launching of its Spring Offensive starting in March 1918 and the return of American troops from North Russia in 1920.  The investigation is based mainly on information included in secondary sources along with selected primary sources such as Wilson’s Aide-Memoir outlining his objectives in Russia and several memorandums, letters, and oral messages between diplomats and ambassadors of various powers involved in the Russian situation.

            The conclusion reached at the end of the investigation suggests that Wilson’s ideological conflict with Bolshevism was subordinated to his political and strategic motivation of stopping Japanese expansion.  Wilson’s personal ideological conflict, according to the essay, only shows up in his decision to provide aid to the Czech Legion, which was under attack from the Bolsheviks en route to continue its fight against the Germans on the Western Front. 

The larger conclusion that can be drawn from the essay is that the claims of Soviet historians and political figures during the cold war, made by Nikita Khrushchev in particular, that Americans “invaded” Russia, are exaggerated. America did send troops to

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Russia, a fact that not all Americans are aware of, but with no serious intention on the part of Wilson of undermining Bolshevik control.

Acknowledgements

            For helping to guide me through the process of writing the extended essay, I would first like to thank my mentor, Marc de Zwaan.   His input and suggestions were invaluable both in finding sources and developing a coherent argument.  Secondly, I would like to thank Mike Grobbel, President of the Polar Bear Memorial Association, who was generous enough to meet with me to help explain the conflict and his grandfather’s personal involvement in it.  He also introduced me to a wealth of information on the subject of American involvement in the Russian Civil War, which helped me to develop my own perspective on the issue.  Finally, I would like to thank Klaudia Janek for helping me use the Michigan Interloan Library system.

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I.                    Introduction

Some orthodox Soviet Historians attribute the seeds of the Cold War to President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to “Intervene” in the Russian civil war.  Since the abortive, confusing attempt failed in 1920 and American troops were brought home, propaganda from the Kremlin began to vilify Wilson for trying to destroy the “first proletarian state in the world”¹. In a visit to the USA in 1959, Nikita Khrushchev said: “We remember the grim days when American soldiers went to our soil, headed by their generals, to help the White Guard… strangle the new revolution”².  Few in the audience understood what Khrushchev was referring to, and even some historians today are not aware of America’s role in the Russian Civil war, or that it had two separate fronts in Northern Russia and Siberia³.  But the authors who have written about America’s role in the war disagree on whether it really constituted an “Intervention”, and what exactly Wilson’s intentions were.

            Authors such as George F. Kennan, Georg Schild, and Victor M. Fic hold that Wilson never intended for any large-scale intervention that would interfere in Russian self-determination, and only sent troops into Russia and Siberia under great pressure from other Allied powers and diplomats.  This school of thought acknowledges the allied motivations of preventing war supplies from falling into German hands, preventing Japanese expansion into Russian territory, and protecting the Czech Legion from the German and Austrian prisoners of war that could potentially be rearmed.  On the other side of the debate, authors such as N.Gordon Levin and John Lewis Gaddis charge

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Wilson with anti-Bolshevik motivations for intervention, portraying him as an aggressor working to undermine the Russian political system.  These sources are all limited by the fact they rely mainly on historical records and selected primary sources.  However, the range of publication dates of the sources as a whole (1958-2004) allows for a broader context in which to interpret Wilson’s actions.

            The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the intentions of Woodrow Wilson in his decision to send American troops to North Russia and Siberia during the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1920.  It does so by examining the relationship between Wilson and the other Allied leaders after America’s entry into the Great War, assessing the pressures on Wilson to send troops into Russia including the sentiment of the American public, analyzing the ideological views that would have affected Wilson’s decision, and evaluating his statements and actions during the “intervention”.  Based on the results of the evaluation, one can conclude that because Wilson vehemently opposed any significant contribution of American troops and forbade Japan to send more than 7,000 of potentially hundreds of thousands of troops, he did not intend to overthrow the deeply entrenched Bolshevik regime.  Perhaps in the strictest sense, Wilson did in fact “intervene”, but not with the serious intention of “strangling the new revolution”.  His true intention in sending troops was to combat Japanese expansion into Russian-held territory and to support the Czech Legion.  His antipathy for the Bolshevik “revolution from above” served not as a motivation for intervention, but as a mitigating factor in his resistance to violating the sixth of his Fourteen Points.

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II. Background to the Conflict

            The overthrow of the hated Tsar Nicholas II in the March Revolution touched a feeling of sympathy in Americans.  “Newspaper Editors, labor leaders, political statesmen, governors, public meetings… hailed the [March] revolution”⁴.  Teddy Roosevelt exclaimed “I rejoice… that Russia… has ranged herself on the side of orderly liberty”⁵.  Meanwhile, Jewish immigrants to America brought with them tales of severe repression under the Romanovs, such as the Kishiniev Slaughter of 1903, in which almost fifty Jews were killed and hundreds were wounded in a government-encouraged pogrom⁶.  Some Americans responded with sympathy and outrage, while others just resented the influx of “poor, radical foreigners adding to the… problems of eastern cities”.  These views combined to form massive opposition to the Tsarist regime, and satisfaction at its demise⁶.  Wilson was at first hesitant to fight alongside a Tsarist autocracy ironically to “make the world safe for democracy”, but after the revolution, Wilson claimed that the US had a “fit partner for a league of honor”⁷.

            Soon Americans had created for themselves an idealized, sentimental view of the Russians with little basis in political reality.  With the trends toward Russian culture in music and plays, the vision of “quasi-mystical peasantry seeking beauty and freedom” planted itself in the mindset of the American people⁸.  Americans assumed that democracy would reinvigorate Russia’s war effort, but they failed to realize that much of what contributed to the downfall of Nicholas II was disgust with war⁹.  This naiveté stemmed from the fact that America had sustained very little damage at that point in the

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war.  One year after America had joined, less than 2,000 men had died, and the harsh realities of war that European belligerents had come to accept had not yet set in America¹⁰.  Everything was still running smoothly, at least ostensibly- sports, music, and other forms of entertainment remained healthy during the war years¹⁰.  Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Americans could scarcely conceive of anyone in Russia voluntarily heeding the call of the “traitors” for peace¹¹.

In April 1916, Germany “exported” a revolution to Russia by smuggling in Lenin, an exile at the time, into Russia.  After Lenin’s successful “November Revolution” in 1917, the social democratic provisional government established in March under the leadership of Alexander Kerensky was dissolved, and the Bolshevik party took over.  One of Lenin’s first actions was to call for an immediate cease-fire between Russia and Germany¹².  Despite the harsh terms that Germany demanded for peace and an initial refusal to accept the loss of Finland, the Baltic States, and any land gained in the Russo-Turkish war, Russiasigned the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, effectively ending the fight against Germany on the eastern front¹³.  At this point, Germany was free to move its troops from the Eastern to the Western Front, gaining the numerical superiority necessary to launch a massive Spring Offensive.  The Allies did not despair, but sought to avoid another year of war if possible¹³.  The German offensive hit the weary, demoralized British troops the hardest.  As the British generals became more desperate, they began to consider the possibility of renewed resistance on the eastern front to spread Germany’s forces more thinly¹⁴.

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III. “Wilson as an Anti-Bolshevist” School of Thought

            Meanwhile, the realization began to dawn on the American people that the Bolsheviks must have at least enjoyed some amount of popular support.  They felt betrayed, and projected their anger onto the Bolsheviks and Russians in general¹⁵.  With the idea of manifest destiny ingrained into the American mindset, applying the same principle in the east would not be unnatural for many Americans¹⁵.  Peter G. Filene claims that “[Wilson] fought the war in order to convert other nations to his ideals, and he dealt with Russia on the same terms”¹⁵.  N. Gordon Levin supports this claim, arguing that Wilson’s political creed, which centered on “American exceptionalism” and the nation’s mission to “enlighten mankind with the principles of its unique liberal heritage”, was fundamentally incompatible with Lenin’s¹⁶.  Lenin was equally unwilling to compromise, opposing any peace that maintained the capitalist status quo, refusing to distinguish any difference between Entente and Central Powers, and rejecting any attempts to “purify” war aims.¹⁶  Inevitably, Levin argues, these mutually exclusive Weltanschauungen led to a direct conflict¹⁷.

It was around this time, especially after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was finally agreed upon on March 3^rd, 1918, that the accusation that German agents were controlling the Bolsheviks began to spread.¹⁸  It was known to Wilson and the Allies that Lenin and Trotsky had been brought back from exile to Russia by the Germans, and probably given support in the toppling of the provisional government¹⁹.  In a June 1918 State Department memorandum, secretary of state Lansing writes:

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“The fact is that while Germany in a way has been using the Bolshevik element either directly through bribes of some of its leaders or as a result of the principles of government they espouse and practice, Germany is appealing to the conservative elements of Russia as their only hope against the Bolsheviks”.¹⁹

Washington was concerned that if the US did not make an attempt to intervene against the Bolsheviks, the anti-Bolshevik elements would turn to Germany for support, thus playing into the plan that Germany had envisioned from the start.  “Examples of Germany’s success in the execution of this plan,” Lansing argues, “are to be seen in Finland and Ukraine where all of the conservative elements… were driven by desperation to request German protection from Bolshevik terror”.²⁰  The so-called “Kulaks” – the class of the moderately successful that the Bolsheviks demonized – could become the political base from which the Germans could expand their influence.  During the crisis of Brest-Litovsk, the US ambassador to Russia Francis cabled to Lansing, stating that even if Lenin and Trotsky were not in the pay of Germany, they “could not have played more successfully into Germany’s hands”²¹.  The fact that Germany may have been benefiting greatly from Wilson’s policy of nonintervention could only have given him more incentive to counter the Bolsheviks.

            The general attitude of the American people at the time was vehemently against domestic socialists, anarchists, and radicals, which set them against the Bolsheviks especially, since they pulled Russia out of the war²².  Despite this fact, Americans forced themselves to remain optimistic regarding the Russian situation, which led to the

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formation of such groups as the “American League to Aid and Cooperate with Russia” and “The Society of the Friends of Russian Freedom”²³.  The Bolsheviks were typically written off as mere demagogues, who would soon lose popular support and fade into oblivion²³.  Also, Filene argues, as anxiety about the war grew, the emotional inability to have more than one real enemy led Americans to sympathize with Russia; the “Hun” was the real enemy, whereas the “Red” could not have been equally despicable.  The Russians were thus interpreted as the victims in need of saving²⁴.  Many liberals, though upset with the November Revolution, saw the Russian crisis as the “acid test” of liberalism itself²⁵.

            So why, if Wilson indeed wanted to strangle the proletarian revolution, did he not immediately capitulate to the pressures of his diplomats, the other allied powers, and the anti-Bolshevik sentiment of the American people?  N.Gordon Levin suggests two reasons: One, Wilson doubted whether reviving the eastern front was even feasible; and two, he feared that the entrance of Anglo-French and Japanese troops would alienate otherwise supportive Russians²⁶.  Wilson’s dilemma, according to Miles Hudson, was that a small-scale intervention could neither topple the Bolsheviks nor maintain order on its own, while a large-scale intervention would be interpreted as a foreign invasion by Western imperialists²⁷.  Also, Wilson had to consider the establishment of his beloved League of Nations, which was contingent upon his credibility and good relations with the other Allied Powers once the war was over²⁸.  Ironically, an “intervention” in Russia would have violated the sixth of Wilson’s Fourteen Points: “The evacuation of all Russian territory… as will secure… for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and

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national policy”²⁹.

            Christopher Pallazolo, who characterizes Wilson as an ardent anti-Bolshevist, holds that he had an “opportune moment” to intervene when Lenin pinned down the troops of the Czech Legion on the Trans-Siberian Railroad who were heading towards Vladivostok³⁰.  The Czechs, still loyal to the Allied cause, were intended to leave Russia via Vladivostok and rejoin the fight at the western front, when the Bolsheviks suddenly halted the trains and demanded assimilation into the Red Guard³⁰.  Intervening with the ostensible cause of responding to the tragic plight of the Czechs would appeal both to Wilson’s idealism and the many Czechs who had recently immigrated to the US³¹.  Also, the Czech Legion could form the “nucleus” around which anti-Bolshevik forces could rally with the support of the Allied Powers.  In fact, after Wilson released his Aide-Memoir, reports were emanating from American diplomats in Siberia that the “nucleus” had already formed³².

            Historian John Lewis Gaddis suggests that the idea that Wilson was concerned about German influence in Russia is faulty, since Germany had planned to move troops to the Western Front for its Spring Offensive, and thus could not spare troops to occupy Russia³³.  Also, the inefficiency of the Russian railroad system would have prevented Germany from using the war supplies allocated to Russiaany more effectively than the Russians did³³.  Despite these facts, Gaddis argues, the true inhibition that Wilsonhad to sending a larger intervention force was the fear of driving the Bolsheviks into German hands³³.  Gaddis also contends that all of Wilson’s actions were based on a loathing for Bolshevism, but that he masked his actions with the pretext of bolstering the war effort,

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promoting allied unity, monitoring the Japanese, and helping the Czechs- anything that would not engender sympathy for the Bolsheviks³⁴.

IV. “Forced into Intervention” School of Thought

            Georg Schild argues that Wilson committed troops to Northern Russia and Siberia under immense pressure, and only after conciliatory efforts had been made to the new government.  In January 1918, Wilson stressed in his Fourteen Points speech that his goal was “to secure further Russian participation in the war by expressing friendship and the willingness to aid the country”³⁵.  Wilson noted the differences between the two nations, but envisioned for Russia a system similar to that of the US, in which a diverse people could enjoy “self-determination without the dissolution of the country”³⁶  From this perspective, intervention in Russia so aggressive as to fracture its political structure would be illogical.  Schild emphasizes that, although Wilson’s ostensible reason for sending troops was to prevent “Germans from utilizing war materials stored in Russia”, his equally important aim was “maintaining Allied unity during the decisive period of the world war”³⁷.  According to Schild, Wilson eventually capitulated to Realpolitik, but was far from oblivious to the necessity for Russian self-determination.

            Historian Victor M. Fic holds the view that the US did not intervene at all in Russia as part of his broader argument that the US should have intervened with the goal of destroying Bolshevism.  He comments on the mindset of Wilsonafter the armistice as a product of “the glitter and hubris of the celebrations accorded to him as the savior of

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Europe at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919”³⁸.  Fic’s argument centers around the

idea that Wilson’s true ambition in sending troops to Russia was to salvage the Czech Legion, sacrificing any gains they had made, rather than to grant Russians self-determination.  At the Supreme War Council meeting on July 2, 1918, Wilson disregarded the Allied proposal to reopen the Eastern Front as well as Lansing’s proposal on Allied action from Vladivostok to the Volga³⁹.  Though Lansing disagreed ideologically with Wilson on the matter of intervention, he faithfully transcribed the memorandum of the council meeting of July 2, which contains the following key points that reveal Wilson’s initial, uncompromised view:

1.      “Establishment of an Eastern Front… is physically impossible”

2.      “…any advance west of Irkutsk… needs no further consideration”

3.      “The present situation of the Czecho-Slovaks requires this government and other governments to make an effort to aid those at Vladivostok in forming a junction with their compatriots in Western Siberia”

4.      “the furnishing of small arms, machine guns, and ammunition to the Czecho-Slovak at Vladivostok by the Japanese government”⁴⁰

Wilson explains in his Aide-Memoir that intervention would not “Serve Russia” but “promote Allied Interests”⁴¹.  However, information reaching Washington at the time, Fic contends, confirmed the opposite.  “Russian people had rallied around the Czechs since early June, and Czechs in turn assisted them in setting up their own military

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formations… The various types of provisional governments… issued invitations to the

allies to intervene”⁴¹.  Wilson did eventually compromise his formerly obstinate opposition to intervention in his July 17 Aide-Memoir, though he never used the word “intervention”.  The Allies wanted far more than the paltry 14,000 troops offered by the Japanese and Americans, but Wilson’s refusal to compromise further essentially killed any hopes for democracy in Russia for the next several decades⁴².  In the Aide-Memoir, Wilson acts as if opening the door for unilateral Allied action when he states: “The government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities, it is seeking… to define the policies of its associates”⁴³.  However, without support from the US, no plan for intervention could go forth.  The French and British were too committed to the Western Front to dispatch any significant force of troops to Russia.  Additionally, Wilson had the ability to simply threaten to remove troops from the Western Front if the Allies ignored Wilson’s policy and relocated troops to Vladivostok⁴³.  Finally, Wilson had the ability to send to Russia vast numbers of Japanese if he was unwilling to divert troops from the Western front.  If he truly wanted to crush Bolshevism absolutely, he had in all about 142,000 men, 35,000 horses, and 90,000 men in reserve from Japan waiting for his order to intervene⁴⁴.

Betty Miller Unterberger argues that after the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, Wilson was “sweating blood” over the question of intervention, but also that his military advisers strongly opposed intervention.  General Tasker H. Bliss, who was the American representative on the Supreme War Council, believed that Siberian Intervention was a “Sideshow born of desperation”⁴⁵.  Unterberger, unlike Victor M. Fic, argues that at least

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in the mind of France and Britain, intervention was primarily a drive to reopen the eastern

front rather than a war to crush Bolshevism⁴⁵.  Also, the chaos at Vladivostok combined with widespread fear of Japanese designs in Siberia increased pressure on Wilson both at home and abroad⁴⁶.  Japan had issued its infamous “21 Demands” in 1915 while the Allies were preoccupied with the fight against Germany, revealing their dependence on China, especially towards the north in Manchuria, for raw materials.⁴⁷  Japan’s position was especially threatening because Wilson did not have as much leverage to influence Japan as it did on France and Britain, two nations that relied on the US to help maintain the Western Front.  It would hardly be a stretch for Wilson to interpret Japanese eagerness to commit large numbers of troops as a move to establish themselves in Siberia. 

Stories from the area claimed that Vladivostok was in flame “While the Bolsheviki were intent on an orgy of murdering and plundering”⁴⁸.  The French especially were considering a large expedition to prevent Bolshevism from spreading to Siberia.  The British, meanwhile, pushed for unilateral Japanese intervention, but Wilson flatly rejected this⁴⁹.  When Ambassador Francis conceded that North Russia could have a strategic advantage, the British quickly persuaded him that there, unlike in Siberia, the Japanese would have no influence, and thus could not be perceived as invaders.  By June 1^st, 1918, Wilson had capitulated and diverted troops from France to North Russia.  Meanwhile, to pressure Wilson into consenting to Siberian intervention, the Allies warned that Japan would act independently or even come to an understanding with Germany⁵⁰.  These arguments had little effect on Wilson, but according to Unterberger,

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rescuing the Czechs gave Wilson a moral justification to expand intervention to Siberia⁵¹.

Wilson proposed that Japan send a maximum of 7,000 troops to Siberia “for political reasons”, but in a response to Secretary Polk on July 24, Ambassador Ishii expressed the view that the limitation was founded on a lack of faith in Japanese intentions⁵².  The Japanese proposed sending a division, approximately 12,000 troops, and possibly more depending on Bolshevik resistance⁵².  Wilson’s final decision, Unterberger argues, was based on two justifications.  First, Wilson had by the time he wrote his Aide-Memoir realized that intervention was inevitable, and that without American counterbalance, Japan would take advantage of its strategic position and available troops.  Second, he wanted to call the allies out of the intervention, should it fail, from the inside rather than as a distant, uninvolved power on the outside, so as to have more credibility.  In her words, “the hand of the United States was forced”⁵³.

V. Conclusions

            In the assessment of Wilson’s motives for sending troops to North Russia and Siberia, regardless of whether it is labeled “intervention” or not, the claim that Wilson intended to crush the Bolsheviks for ideological reasons represents a distortion of the character of the conflict.  The most obvious counterargument to this claim is the fact that Wilson himself was the biggest advocate for limitations on troops.  One must also consider the ideological aspects of a proposed intervention.  Wilson’s faith in self-determination and hopes for a successful League of Nations would have strongly

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influenced his decisions.  While Britain was urging Ambassador Francis and President

Wilson to allow Japan to take charge of the intervention using their vast surplus of troops and equipment, Wilson refused to yield on the issue, and ultimately sent his own troops as a means to restrain Japan.         

While it is true that the Weltanschauungen of Wilson and Lenin were mutually exclusive, this ideological conflict did not necessarily lead to a military conflict.  Wilson had enough political experience to distinguish when to sacrifice ideology for Realpolitik.  For example, in the Mexican revolution, Wilson chose not to send a traditional intervention force to topple the oppressive government.  Instead, he chose to undermine Mexican feudalism from within by developing a policy of aid to the Mexican constitutionalists, eventually creating “the prerequisites for liberalism, capitalism, and stability in Mexico”⁵⁴.

            One factor in Wilson’s decision that must not be overlooked in an assessment is the sentiment of the people.  Despite the fact that American sentiment was decidedly against prolonged intervention soon after the armistice was signed, the general mood leading up to Wilson’s publication of the Aide-Memoir was one fervently in favor of intervening in Russia.  To a leader as concerned as Wilson with rule by consent, public opinion would have held a strong influence. While Wilson himself may not have believed that the Russian people had been taken advantage of by a despotic regime, he was certainly in favor of the March revolution and the creation of a Provisional government under Alexander Kerensky.  The news of the November Revolution and the dealings at Brest-Litovsk for a separate peace with Germany would have dealt a severe blow to

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Wilson’s perception of the Russian situation, ideologically if not militarily.  However, ideological differences alone would not have been enough to provoke Wilson to intervene.  The most significant impact that ideological differences could have had on Wilson’s decision would have been to mitigate his resistance to sending troops and encourage him to act against Japanese designs.

            Aside from ideological differences, and before the Armistice was signed, much of Wilson’s decision to send troops was based on the fear that the middle and upper class Russians who held political influence, so called “Kulaks”, who were threatened by the ideology of the Bolsheviks, would turn to the Germans as a solution.  Considering the fact that the Germans had brought Lenin and Trotsky out of exile and back into Russia soon after the March Revolution, this fear would seem irrational.  But due to a similar situation in the Ukraine in which conservative elements appealed to Germans for support, the fear that Germans had anticipated and planned to take advantage of conservative backlash against socialism could not have seemed too far-fetched to Wilson, especially in light of German and Austrian prisoners of war that could potentially be rearmed in Russia. 

            Regarding the plight of the Czech Legion and the massive international and domestic support for providing them aid, authors such as Christopher Pallazolo and E.M. Halliday claim that Wilson used their crisis as a pretext to attack the Bolsheviks.  But evidence from Victor M. Fic suggests otherwise, that Wilson only intended to form a “nucleus” of popular support that would allow the Czechs safe passage out of Russia so that they could rejoin the fight on the Western Front.

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In Conclusion, Wilson’s primary motivation was strategic, with an ideological aspect that mitigated his initial resistance to committing to a conflict that would violate the sixth of his fourteen points and possibly undermine his credibility among other nations and the Allies in particular.  Lenin’s ideology in which an elite vanguard who knew what was best for the people would rule for them may have been antithetical to Wilson’s vision of self-determination, but his real, practical reason for sending troops was to check Japanese ambitions in Siberia.  In light of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria during the Interwar Crisis, and the League’s subsequent inability to do anything to stop it, this precaution on Wilson’s part was justified.  The fact that Wilson, despite his devotion to freedom and self-determination, only sent a minimal number of troops into Russia shows that his anti-Bolshevik sentiment was subordinated to his strategic mission of checking Japanese designs on Siberia without the Russian people perceiving troops as the forefront of an American invasion.

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End Notes

¹ Fic, Victor M. The Collapse of American Policy in Russia and Siberia, 1918. Colombia University Press, New York 1995 pp. 24

² Halliday, E.M. When Hell Froze Over. Ibooks, Inc., New York 2000 pp. Ii

³ Interview with Mike Grobbel

⁴ Filene, Peter G. Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1967 pp. 10

⁵ Ibid., p. 10

⁶ Ibid., p. 11

⁷ Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York 1978 pp. 58

⁸ Filene, p. 12

⁹ Ibid., p. 12

¹⁰ Kennan, George F. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene. Princeton UP, Princeton 1958 p. 5

¹¹ Filene, p. 13

¹² Strachan, Hew. The First World War. Penguin Group, New York 2004 pp. 263

¹³ Kennan, p. 3

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 4

¹⁵ Filene, p. 17

¹⁶ Levin, N. Gordon Jr. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution. Oxford University Press, New York 1970 p. 13

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 76

¹⁸ Filene, p. 21

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¹⁹ Levin, p. 92

²⁰ Ibid. p. 92

²¹ Ibid. p. 94

²² Filene p. 21

²³ Ibid. p. 23

²⁴ Ibid. p. 24

²⁵ Ibid. p. 27

²⁶ Levin, p. 95

²⁷ Hudson, Miles. Intervention in Russia: 1918-1920. Pen and Sword, Barnsley 2004 p. 174

²⁸ Pallazolo, Christopher. American Intervention In Russia: A Study of Wilsonian foreign Policy.  Modus Vivendi 3.1 (1997) pp. 4

²⁹ Halliday p. 23

³⁰ Pallazolo, p. 5

³¹ Halliday, p. 26

³² Fic p. 190

³³ Gaddis, p. 67

³⁴ Ibid. p. 34

³⁵ Schild, Georg. Between Ideology and Realpolitik. Greenwood Press, Westport 1995 p. 61

³⁶ Ibid. p. 61

³⁷ Ibid. p. 70

³⁸ Fic X

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³⁹ Ibid. p. 176

40 Ibid. p. 177

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 189

⁴² Ibid. p.192

⁴³ Ibid. p. 195

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 196

⁴⁵ Unterberger, Betty Miller. America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920: A Study of National Policy. Duke University Press, Durham N.C. 1956 p. 21

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 22

⁴⁷ Hanneman, Mary L. Japan Faces the World, 1925-1952. Longman Publishing Group, Harlow 2001 p.7

⁴⁸ Unterberger p. 23

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 11

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 52

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 60

⁵² Ibid. p. 82

⁵³ Ibid. p. 88

⁵⁴ Levin p. 20

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Works Cited

Fic, Victor M. The Collapse of American Policy in Russia and Siberia, 1918. Colombia                   University Press, New York 1995

Filene, Peter G. Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933. Harvard University         Press, Cambridge 1967

Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive         History. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York 1978

Halliday, E.M. When Hell Froze Over. Ibooks, Inc., New York 2000

Hanneman, Mary L. Japan Faces the World, 1925-1952. Longman Publishing Group,             Harlow 2001

Hudson, Miles. Intervention in Russia: 1918-1920. Pen and Sword, Barnsley 2004

Kennan, George F. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene.        Princeton UP, Princeton 1958

Levin, N. Gordon Jr. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War                   and Revolution. Oxford University Press, New York 1970

Pallazolo, Christopher. American Intervention In Russia: A Study of Wilsonian foreign                     Policy.  Modus Vivendi 3.1 (1997)

Schild, Georg. Between Ideology and Realpolitik. Greenwood Press, Westport 1995

Strachan, Hew. The First World War. Penguin Group, New York 2004

Unterberger, Betty Miller. America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920: A Study of     National Policy. Duke University Press, Durham N.C. 1956